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1 Path dependent processes
1. Technological progress is, amongst other things, a
path-dependent process.
2. An important implication is that history matters and,
indeed, it matters greatly. Thus, early events, that is
occurrences that had taken place a long time past, even
of an entirely random nature may cause a lock-in into
suboptimal trajectories.
3. Consider this example taken from B. Arthur (1989).
Assume:
- two techniques: A and B
- two types of agents: R and S
- an important, empirically validated, fact: increasing re-
turns to adoption.
4. The assumption of two techniques is made to suppose
that they compete in some market, e.g. investors having
to set up a new production process or consumers choosing
a particular durable (car, appliance, phone). The assump-
tion of two types of agents is made to ensure some het-
erogeneity in tastes, world views, tendencies. Moreover,
increasing returns seem to be a well established fact: the
more are techniques acquired and used the more they are
subject to improvement and, hence, the higher is their re-
turn. To be more specic, it can be assumed that agents
R, prefer other things being equal, technique A, whilst
agents S prefer technique B.
5. Call:
RA technique A returns to agents of type R
SA technique A returns to agents of type S
RB technique B returns to agents of type R
SB technique B returns to agents of type S
nA the number of technique A adoptions
nB the number of technique B adoptions
now assume a very simple, linear increasing returns rule
RA = aR + rnA
RB = bR + rnB
aR > bR
and
SA = aS + snA
SB = bS + snB
bS > aS
the inequalities indicate the preferences of agents R and
S at the beginning of the adoption process. Coe¢ cients
r and s may or may not coincide.
6. In spite of initial preferences, it is clear that if nA
is su¢ ciently small in relation to nB, the higher returns
of the latter technique induces R to switch to B:This
occurs if and when
dnR =  
aR   bR
r
in Ss case, if and when
dnS =
bS   aS
s
where dn = nA   nB
7. As long as:
- dn > dnR, R chooses A
- dn < dnS, S chooses B
but
- dn < dnR, R chooses B and S, a fortiori, chooses
B
- dn > dnS, S chooses A and A a fortiori, chooses A
It is immediate to see that the two thresholds set critical
adoption points at which one of the two techniques ceases
to compete. A lock-in into a single technique occurs that
at least for some agents is not the preferred one.
8. To realise how such a lock-in can actually occur, it is
enough to assume that adoptions are a random process.
Thus, start a random walk by drawing one agent say R
who will surely choose A:
for instance;
R ! A;S ! B;S ! B;R ! A;R ! A;R !
A;S ! B;S ! B;S ! B; ::::::::::::::
It is quite evident that returns, being cumulative, oscillate
according to the number of adoptions. It is, in fact, quite
possible that the number of adoptions cross one of the
two thresholds to lock the process into only one of the
two techniques.
9. The problem: what are the conditions such that the
process does cross either of the two thresholds with prob-
ability 1?
10. Some background: the no history case.
Suppose that techniques, say N techniques, could be
drawn out from a very large urn, in principle N ! 1.
They are randomly distributed and are tagged to balls.
Now, start drawing and put these ballsinto another urn.
Call the proportions of ballsof a given type in the sec-
ond urn Xi, the vector of all ballsX and the probability
of extracting a ball always from the second urn pi and p
the corresponding vector:
- it is Xi = pi 8i
- and X(t)! X = p
That is proportions and probabilities are equal and con-
verge to an invariant proportion-probability.
Example: toss a coin: Xi = pi =
1
2
12. From the no history case to some path dependence:
the standard Polya case.
Again, take an urn of innite capacity and repeat the
same experiment as before but, this time, modify the
process in the following way: every time a ball is put
into the second urn, take a draw therefrom and check
the colour. Now, add into the urn a new ball of the
same colour. This procedure is meant to create a bias to-
wards path dependence: the fact that a random event oc-
curs shifts the balance towards the same event occurring
again. For example, suppose the rst urn ( a reservoir) is
made up of Red ballsR and White ballsW:Suppose
that initially, at time t = 0, there happen to be 1 R and
1 W in the second urn: the probability of drawing either
R or W is 12:
pW (0) = pR(0) =
1
2, and the proportion XW (0) =
XR(0) =
1
2, X(0) = p(0)
Now draw: by chance a Red ball R comes out. Thus,
add a new R. There are now, 2 Rs and 1 W .
Accordingly, XW (1) =
1
3; XR(1) =
2
3, pW (1) =
1
3 ;
pR(1) =
2
3; X(1) = p(1)
Continue: X(t) = p(t)
It can be shown that: X = p convergence to an equi-
librium.
Repeat the experiment: it is clear that the path will be
di¤erent butX(t) = p(t). Thus, convergence still occurs
X = p but, in general, this new equilibrium is di¤erent
from the previous case. There is NO unique equilibrium!!!
13. The complete path dependent case: X(0) 6= p(0)
from the very beginning (on account, for instance of
agentspreferences). Let the case be stated formally,
qt = qt(Xt) be a vector of probability functions (e.g. a
function for each technique) and
Xt be a vector of proportions.
bt be the number of ballsin an urn.
14. We require some denitions: a stochastic variable
it(Xt) =
1 with qit(Xt)
0 with 1  qit(Xt)
ruling the following updating rule:
bit+1 = b
i
t + 
i
t(Xt)
which can be transformed in terms of proportions by tak-
ing into account that the process starts with ! ballsin
the urn, adds 1 at each point in time so that there are
! + t ballsat time t: Xit =
bit
!+t. It is:
Xit+1 = X
i
t +
1
! + t+ 1
h
it(Xt) Xit
i
15. Take, the expected proportions in the urn;
E

Xit+1

= Xit +
1
! + t+ 1
h
E

it(Xt)

 Xit
i
that is:
E

Xit+1

= Xit +
1
! + t+ 1
h
qit(Xt) Xit
i
16.Thus, it is basically qit(Xt) that provides the dynamics
that can be studied by looking at the deterministic system
Xit+1 = X
i
t +
1
! + t+ 1
h
qit(Xt) Xit
i
and much depends on the shape of qit(Xt)
17. The stationary points when qi(X) = Xi 8i
Using vector symbols:
X = q
Solutions for stationary points need not be unique and
need not be stable.
18 The fundamental theorem:
- Suppose continuous functions fqtg
- Suppose that fqtg ! q i.e. they converge and converge
rapidly
- Suppose that the equivalent deterministic system is a
gradient system
- Suppose that a set can be denedB = fx; q(X) = Xg,
that is a set of equilibrium, stationary points, and that it
is nite and connected.
Then
- fXtg converges to an X with Probability 1 dening a
point z 2 B.
19. Note that the assumption that the equivalent deter-
ministic system be a gradient system is fundamental. In
general a gradient system

x =  gradV (x)
V (x) being a rst order di¤erential operator.
20. In practise, it is required that the eigenvalues of the
linearised system be real and negative or at least that the
real parts be such, that it be asymptotically stable, that
there be no periodic solutions (limit cycles). For short,
Xt+1 = Xt +  [q(Xt) Xt]
transform it as

X = F (q(Xt))
linearise it as

X =

@F
@X

X=X
X
and require that the above properties be satised.
21. There are many applications of this theorem. An
important one concerns locational dynamics.
- Why have some cities grown more than others?
- Why have some regions become highly specialised in-
dustrial districts?
- Why have some neighbourhoods or streets in many
cities become specialised in some specic trades (jew-
elers, leather shops, shoe shops etc.)? More generally,
- Why do clusters of rms and industries develop?
There may be many concurrent reasons but the above
theorem shows that some random events early on may
be a su¢ cient one.
22. As an example consider two late medieval and renais-
sance poles of growth Venice and Bruges: two locations
N = 2. The locational dynamics can be mimicked as
follows:
a) There is a population V of Venetians merchants: 100
b) There is a population F of Flemish merchants: 80
They must choose a location.
Suppose that the two lots have di¤erent preferences but
that choice is independent of previous choices.
The table of probabilities revealing preferences:
V (V enice) = :9 ; V (Bruges) = :1
F (V enice) = :3 ; F (Bruges) = :7
What is the probability that the next merchant will choose
either Venice or Bruges?
P (V enice) =
100
180
9
10
+
80
180
3
10
= :63
P (Bruges) = sameprocedure::::::: = :37
If the process remains totally random :
63% of all merchants in Venice
37% of all merchants in Bruges
i.e. the case pi = Xi from the outset.
But if history matters and
qt(V enice) = qtV [Xt(V enice);Xt(Bruges)]
qt(Bruges) = qtB[Xt(V enice);Xt(Bruges)]
according to the specic shape of such functions the
process may end up All in Venice, all in Bruges or some
intermediate proportion, say 80% in Venice and 20% in
Bruges.
